"Tab, Tab, Bug": Security Pitfalls of Next Edit Suggestions in AI-Integrated IDEs
Yunlong Lyu, Yixuan Tang, Peng Chen, Tian Dong, Xinyu Wang, Zhiqiang Dong, Hao Chen

TL;DR
This paper systematically investigates the security vulnerabilities of Next Edit Suggestions (NES) in AI-integrated IDEs, revealing increased attack surfaces and the need for better security awareness and countermeasures.
Contribution
It provides the first detailed analysis of NES mechanisms, identifies new security threat vectors, and evaluates their implications through lab experiments and a developer survey.
Findings
NES retrieves expanded context, increasing attack surfaces.
NES is vulnerable to context poisoning and sensitive to user interactions.
Developers lack awareness of NES security risks.
Abstract
Modern AI-integrated IDEs are shifting from passive code completion to proactive Next Edit Suggestions (NES). Unlike traditional autocompletion, NES is designed to construct a richer context from both recent user interactions and the broader codebase to suggest multi-line, cross-line, or even cross-file modifications. This evolution significantly streamlines the programming workflow into a tab-by-tab interaction and enhances developer productivity. Consequently, NES introduces a more complex context retrieval mechanism and sophisticated interaction patterns. However, existing studies focus almost exclusively on the security implications of standalone LLM-based code generation, ignoring the potential attack vectors posed by NES in modern AI-integrated IDEs. The underlying mechanisms of NES remain under-explored, and their security implications are not yet fully understood. In this…
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