Jamming Attacks on the Random Access Channel in 5G and B5G Networks

TL;DR

This paper develops an analytical model and experimental validation for Msg1 jamming attacks on the RACH in 5G/B5G networks, revealing how low-power jamming can disrupt legitimate user access.

Contribution

It introduces a new analytical model for Msg1 jamming impact and demonstrates its accuracy through over-the-air experiments using open-source hardware.

Findings

Low-power Msg1 jamming effectively blocks user access

The analytical model accurately predicts jamming impact

Over-the-air experiments validate the model's effectiveness

Abstract

Random Access Channel (RACH) jamming poses a critical security threat to 5G and beyond (B5G) networks. This paper presents an analytical model for predicting the impact of Msg1 jamming attacks on RACH performance. We use the OpenAirInterface (OAI) open-source user equipment (UE) to implement a Msg1 jamming attacker. Over-the-air experiments validate the accuracy of the proposed analytical model. The results show that low-power and stealthy Msg1 jamming can effectively block legitimate UE access in 5G/B5G systems.