Higher-order adaptive behaviors outperform pairwise strategies in mitigating contagion dynamics
Marco Mancastroppa, M\'arton Karsai, Alain Barrat

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that adaptive behaviors based on higher-order group interactions are more effective and socially efficient in controlling contagion spread than those based on pairwise interactions, through simulations and analytic models.
Contribution
It introduces a comparison of higher-order versus pairwise adaptive behaviors in contagion dynamics, highlighting the superior effectiveness of higher-order information-based strategies.
Findings
Higher-order adaptive behaviors better limit contagion spread.
They reduce social costs by decreasing interaction intensity.
Heterogeneous risk perception emerges from higher-order information.
Abstract
When exposed to a contagion phenomenon, individuals may respond to the perceived risk of infection by adopting behavioral changes, aiming to reduce their exposure or their risk of infecting others. The social cost of such adaptive behaviors and their impact on the contagion dynamics have been investigated in pairwise networks, with binary interactions driving both contagion and risk perception. However, contagion and adaptive mechanisms can also be driven by group (higher-order) interactions. Here, we consider several adaptive behaviors triggered by awareness of risk perceived through higher-order and pairwise interactions, and we compare their impact on pairwise and higher-order contagion processes. By numerical simulations and a mean-field analytic approach, we show that adaptive behaviors driven by higher-order information are more effective in limiting the spread of a contagion,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
