DF-LoGiT: Data-Free Logic-Gated Backdoor Attacks in Vision Transformers
Xiaozuo Shen, Yifei Cai, Rui Ning, Chunsheng Xin, Hongyi Wu

TL;DR
DF-LoGiT is a novel data-free backdoor attack method on Vision Transformers that directly edits model weights to embed stealthy, logic-gated triggers, achieving high success rates without additional data or model components.
Contribution
It introduces the first truly data-free backdoor attack on ViTs using weight editing and exploits the multi-head architecture for logic-gated triggers.
Findings
Achieves near-100% attack success rate.
Maintains high benign accuracy.
Remains robust against defenses.
Abstract
The widespread adoption of Vision Transformers (ViTs) elevates supply-chain risk on third-party model hubs, where an adversary can implant backdoors into released checkpoints. Existing ViT backdoor attacks largely rely on poisoned-data training, while prior data-free attempts typically require synthetic-data fine-tuning or extra model components. This paper introduces Data-Free Logic-Gated Backdoor Attacks (DF-LoGiT), a truly data-free backdoor attack on ViTs via direct weight editing. DF-LoGiT exploits ViT's native multi-head architecture to realize a logic-gated compositional trigger, enabling a stealthy and effective backdoor. We validate its effectiveness through theoretical analysis and extensive experiments, showing that DF-LoGiT achieves near-100% attack success with negligible degradation in benign accuracy and remains robust against representative classical and ViT-specific…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · Security and Verification in Computing
