QuietPrint: Protecting 3D Printers Against Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks
Seyed Ali Ghazi Asgar, Narasimha Reddy

TL;DR
This paper introduces QuietPrint, a method to defend 3D printers from acoustic side-channel attacks that steal design IP, using minimal G-code modifications without extra hardware.
Contribution
We propose a novel, hardware-free approach to protect 3D printing processes from acoustic side-channel IP theft by modifying G-code commands.
Findings
Effective in preventing acoustic side-channel attacks
Requires no additional hardware or noise-canceling devices
Minimal impact on printing process
Abstract
The 3D printing market has experienced significant growth in recent years, with an estimated revenue of 15 billion USD for 2025. Cyber-attacks targeting the 3D printing process whether through the machine itself, the supply chain, or the fabricated components are becoming increasingly common. One major concern is intellectual property (IP) theft, where a malicious attacker gains access to the design file. One method for carrying out such theft is through side-channel attacks. In this work, we investigate the possibility of IP theft via acoustic side channels and propose a novel method to protect 3D printers against such attacks. The primary advantage of our approach is that it requires no additional hardware, such as large speakers or noise-canceling devices. Instead, it secures printed parts by minimal modifications to the G-code.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · Cryptographic Implementations and Security · Security and Verification in Computing
