Simple and Robust Quality Disclosure: The Power of Quantile Partition
Shipra Agrawal, Yiding Feng, Wei Tang

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that quantile-partition disclosure policies provide a robust, near-optimal way to communicate quality information on online platforms, ensuring stable revenue performance across various market conditions.
Contribution
It offers a complete characterization of the optimal quantile-partition disclosure policy and establishes its superiority over simpler threshold-based methods in worst-case scenarios.
Findings
Optimal worst-case revenue ratio is characterized by a fixed-point equation.
Quantile partitions allocate finer resolution to upper quantiles for better guarantees.
Finite-signal monotone partitions cannot achieve better than a factor-2 approximation.
Abstract
Quality information on online platforms is often conveyed through simple, percentile-based badges and tiers that remain stable across different market environments. Motivated by this empirical evidence, we study robust quality disclosure in a market where a platform commits to a public disclosure policy mapping the seller's product quality into a signal, and the seller subsequently sets a downstream monopoly price. Buyers have heterogeneous private types and valuations that are linear in quality. We evaluate a disclosure policy via a minimax competitive ratio: its worst-case revenue relative to the Bayesian-optimal disclosure-and-pricing benchmark, uniformly over all prior quality distributions, type distributions, and admissible valuations. Our main results provide a sharp theoretical justification for quantile-partition disclosure. For K-quantile partition policies, we fully…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications
