Greedy Routing Reachability Games
Pascal Lenzner, Paraskevi Machaira

TL;DR
This paper models the formation of greedy routing networks as a game among autonomous agents, analyzing equilibria, efficiency, and algorithms for network design in Euclidean spaces.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic framework for greedy routing network formation, analyzing equilibria existence, computational complexity, and efficiency bounds in Euclidean spaces.
Findings
Equilibria exist with optimal total cost in directed edge models.
NP-hardness of computing optimal strategies even in simple settings.
Price of anarchy between 1.75 and 1.8 in 2D Euclidean space.
Abstract
Today's networks consist of many autonomous entities that follow their own objectives, i.e., smart devices or parts of large AI systems, that are interconnected. Given the size and complexity of most communication networks, each entity typically only has a local view and thus must rely on a local routing protocol for sending and forwarding packets. A common solution for this is greedy routing, where packets are locally forwarded to a neighbor in the network that is closer to the packet's destination. In this paper we investigate a game-theoretic model with autonomous agents that aim at forming a network where greedy routing is enabled. The agents are positioned in a metric space and each agent tries to establish as few links as possible, while maintaining that it can reach every other agent via greedy routing. Thus, this model captures how greedy routing networks are formed without…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems · Distributed Control Multi-Agent Systems
