Supply Chain Insecurity: Exposing Vulnerabilities in iOS Dependency Management Systems
David Schmidt, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Edgar Weippl

TL;DR
This paper uncovers security vulnerabilities in iOS dependency management systems, especially CocoaPods, revealing how attackers can exploit information leakage and abandoned domains to compromise apps and developer environments.
Contribution
It provides a detailed analysis of security flaws in CocoaPods, Carthage, and SwiftPM, and quantifies their impact on iOS app security through empirical data.
Findings
Internal package info leaks enable dependency confusion attacks
Hijacking abandoned domains can compromise multiple apps
Vulnerabilities affect millions of iOS users
Abstract
Dependency management systems are a critical component in software development, enabling projects to incorporate existing functionality efficiently. However, misconfigurations and malicious actors in these systems pose severe security risks, leading to supply chain attacks. Despite the widespread use of smartphone apps, the security of dependency management systems in the iOS software supply chain has received limited attention. In this paper, we focus on CocoaPods, one of the most widely used dependency management systems for iOS app development, but also examine the security of Carthage and Swift Package Manager (SwiftPM). We demonstrate that iOS apps expose internal package names and versions. Attackers can exploit this leakage to register previously unclaimed dependencies in CocoaPods, enabling remote code execution (RCE) on developer machines and build servers. Additionally, we…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Malware Detection Techniques · Information and Cyber Security · Software Engineering Research
