Obviously Strategy-Proof Multi-Dimensional Allocation and the Value of Choice

TL;DR

This paper explores how a principal can design allocation mechanisms that are obviously strategy-proof (OSP) in multi-dimensional settings, balancing agent preferences and rights to demand status-quo assignments, with implications for delegation.

Contribution

It characterizes conditions for beneficial delegation and identifies OSP mechanisms in complex multi-task allocation scenarios.

Findings

Conditions under which delegation improves outcomes

Characterization of OSP mechanisms in multi-dimensional settings

Guidance for selecting among OSP mechanisms

Abstract

A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private information. The principal is constrained by the fact that each agent has the right to demand some status-quo task assignment. I characterize the conditions under which the principal can gain by delegating some control over the assignment to the agents. Within a large class of delegation mechanisms, I then characterize those that are obviously strategy-proof (OSP), and provide guidance for choosing among OSP mechanisms.