Extreme Points and Large Contests
Giovanni Valvassori Bolg\`e
TL;DR
This paper characterizes the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions and applies these findings to large contests, simplifying the analysis of optimal allocation rules and equilibria under broad preferences.
Contribution
It introduces a novel characterization of extreme points for a class of functions and applies this to improve understanding of contest design and equilibrium analysis.
Findings
Characterization of extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions
Simplified equilibrium analysis in large contests with complete information
Representation of optimal allocation rules under broad preferences
Abstract
In this paper, we characterize the extreme points of a class of multidimensional monotone functions. This result is then applied to large contests, where it provides a useful representation of optimal allocation rules under a broad class of distributional preferences of the contest designer. In contests with complete information, the representation significantly simplifies the characterization of the equilibria.
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications