Adaptive dynamics of alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with memory N

TL;DR

This paper explores the adaptive dynamics of the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with finite memory, focusing on the case of memory 1, to better understand strategic evolution in asymmetric, turn-based interactions.

Contribution

It provides a mathematical analysis of the adaptive dynamics in the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with finite memory, especially for memory 1, addressing asymmetries in decision-making.

Findings

Mathematical characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory 1

Insights into strategy evolution in asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma

Framework applicable to donor-recipient reciprocity models

Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma is used as a model in processes involving reciprocity; however, its classical setup can be insufficient in settings where the symmetry of the simultaneous decision making is broken -- for example, in donor and recipient processes. In the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma model the two players take turns choosing their strategy. Assuming a finite memory setup, we establish the mathematical aspects of the adaptive dynamics of the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma, paying particular attention to the case of memory 1.