Data Siphoning Through Advanced Persistent Transmission Attacks At The Physical Layer

TL;DR

This paper investigates the feasibility of a new awareness and integrity protocol designed to mitigate physical layer side-channel attacks, such as eavesdropping and denial-of-service, which threaten data confidentiality and integrity.

Contribution

It proposes a novel protocol aimed at detecting and preventing physical layer attacks, addressing a gap in existing security measures for physical data transmission.

Findings

Feasibility of the proposed protocol demonstrated

Potential to enhance physical layer security

Addresses physical side-channel attack vulnerabilities

Abstract

Data at the physical layer transmits via media such as copper cable, fiber optic, or wireless. Physical attack vectors exist that challenge data confidentiality and availability. Protocols and encryption standards help obfuscate but often cannot keep the data type and destination secure, with limited insight into confidentiality and integrity. We will investigate the feasibility of developing an awareness and integrity protocol to help mitigate physical side-channel attacks that lead to eavesdropping of data communication and denial-of-service. Keywords: data confidentiality, siphoning, eavesdropping, person-in-the-middle, denial-of-service, physical layer attacks, nation-states