Credit Fairness: Online Fairness In Shared Resource Pools
Seyed Majid Zahedi, Rupert Freeman

TL;DR
This paper introduces credit fairness in shared resource pools, ensuring early lenders can recoup resources later, balancing fairness with efficiency or strategyproofness in dynamic agent settings.
Contribution
It proposes a new credit fairness mechanism that enhances sharing incentives by allowing resource lenders to recover their contributions over time.
Findings
The proposed mechanism achieves credit fairness and Pareto efficiency.
It balances fairness and efficiency in resource sharing.
Experimental results demonstrate improved fairness in computational settings.
Abstract
We consider a setting in which a group of agents share resources that must be allocated among them in each discrete time period. Agents have time-varying demands and derive constant marginal utility from each unit of resource received up to their demand, with zero utility for any additional resources. In this setting, it is known that independently maximizing the minimum utility in each round satisfies sharing incentives (agents weakly prefer participating in the mechanism to not participating), strategyproofness (agents have no incentive to misreport their demands), and Pareto efficiency (Freeman et al. 2018). However, recent work (Vuppalapati et al. 2023) has shown that this max-min mechanism can lead to large disparities in the total resources received by agents, even when they have the same average demand. In this paper, we introduce credit fairness, a strengthening of sharing…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
