Intelligence Requires Grounding But Not Embodiment
Marcus Ma, Shrikanth Narayanan

TL;DR
This paper argues that grounding, rather than embodiment, is essential for intelligence, demonstrating that non-embodied agents can possess key intelligent properties through grounding in digital environments.
Contribution
It clarifies the distinction between grounding and embodiment, showing that grounding suffices for intelligence and challenging the necessity of embodiment.
Findings
Grounded non-embodied agents can possess motivation and understanding.
Embodiment is not a necessary condition for intelligence.
Thought experiment supports grounding as sufficient for intelligent behavior.
Abstract
Recent advances in LLMs have reignited scientific debate over whether embodiment is necessary for intelligence. We present the argument that intelligence requires grounding, a phenomenon entailed by embodiment, but not embodiment itself. We define intelligence as the possession of four properties -- motivation, predictive ability, understanding of causality, and learning from experience -- and argue that each can be achieved by a non-embodied, grounded agent. We use this to conclude that grounding, not embodiment, is necessary for intelligence. We then present a thought experiment of an intelligent LLM agent in a digital environment and address potential counterarguments.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEmbodied and Extended Cognition · Action Observation and Synchronization · Language and cultural evolution
