On a Coupled Adoption-Opinion Framework for Competing Innovations
Martina Alutto, Fabrizio Dabbene, Angela Fontan, Karl H. Johansson, Chiara Ravazzi

TL;DR
This paper introduces a coupled adoption-opinion model to analyze how two competing technologies spread and coexist in a population, highlighting the influence of opinions and user experience on market dynamics.
Contribution
It presents a novel two-layer model linking adoption and opinion dynamics, proving the existence of a stable coexistence equilibrium and analyzing the effects of interventions.
Findings
Technologies can coexist without partial or monopoly dominance.
Opinions influence equilibrium adoption levels, but market share depends on user experience.
Symmetric interventions can lead to asymmetric market outcomes.
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a two-layer adoption-opinion model to study the diffusion of two competing technologies within a population whose opinions evolve under social influence and adoption-driven feedback. After adopting one technology, individuals may become dissatisfied and switch to the alternative. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the adoption-diffused equilibrium, showing that both technologies coexist and that neither partial-adoption nor monopoly can arise. Numerical simulations show that while opinions shape the equilibrium adoption levels, the relative market share between the two technologies depends solely on their user-experience. As a consequence, interventions that symmetrically boost opinions or adoption can disproportionately favor the higher-quality technology, illustrating how symmetric control actions may generate asymmetric outcomes.
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting · Game Theory and Applications
