The Impossibility of Cohesion Without Fragmentation
Daisuke Hirota

TL;DR
This paper presents a formal structural theory explaining why social cohesion and fragmentation often occur together, showing that avoiding collapse is impossible under certain conditions, with implications for understanding polarized relations.
Contribution
It introduces a novel constraint satisfaction framework for social relations, revealing structural asymmetries and impossibility results related to cohesion and fragmentation.
Findings
Fragmentation and cohesion necessarily coexist under non-degenerate constraints.
Veto power asymmetry: relation maintenance requires conjunction, collapse requires disjunction.
Avoiding collapse is impossible under positional plurality, implying coercive homogenization.
Abstract
Why do division and cohesion often intensify together? This paper develops a static structural theory of relation maintenance based on minimal positional constraints. Rather than relying on utility-based or probabilistic models, social relations are formalized as constraint satisfaction problems over an abstract position space. When a bifurcation event -- such as a vote or institutional assignment -- fixes agents' positions, relational viability is determined solely by positional compatibility. We establish three structural results. First, under any non-degenerate positional constraint, fragmentation (relational collapse) and cohesion (condition confirmation) necessarily coexist as complementary outputs of a single compatibility function. Second, we prove a structural asymmetry of veto power: relation maintenance requires logical conjunction, while collapse requires only logical…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Voting Systems
