Economic feasibility of virtual operators in 5G via network slicing
Erwin J. Sacoto-Cabrera, Luis Guijarro, Jose R. Vidal, Vicent Pla

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the economic feasibility of virtual operators in 5G network slicing, proposing two business models and using game theory and queue modeling to evaluate incentives and user subscription rates.
Contribution
It introduces two novel business models for virtual operators in 5G slicing and models their economic and system interactions using game theory and queue analysis.
Findings
Network operator can be incentivized to serve virtual operators' users.
Strategic model yields higher user subscription rates.
Economic incentives can align operator and user interests.
Abstract
The provision of services by more than one operator over a common network infrastructure, as enabled by 5G network slicing, is analyzed. Two business models to be implemented by a network operator, who owns the network, and a virtual operator, who does not, are proposed. In one business model, named \emph{strategic}, the network operator provides service to its user base and the virtual operator provides service to its user base and pays a per-subscriber fee to the network operator. In the other business model, named \emph{monopolistic}, the network operator provides service to both user bases. The two proposals are analyzed by means of a model that captures both system and economic features. As regards the systems features, the slicing of the network is modeled by means of a Discriminatory Processor Sharing queue. As regards the economic features, the incentives are modeled by means of…
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