Towards Simple and Useful One-Time Programs in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Lev Stambler

TL;DR
This paper presents a simple, simulation-secure construction of one-time memories in the quantum random oracle model, secure against realistic quantum adversaries with bounded or adaptive depth, advancing practical quantum cryptography.
Contribution
It introduces a minimal scheme using single-qubit states and a new POVM bound, along with security proofs against depth-bounded quantum adversaries in the random oracle model.
Findings
Construction of simulation-secure OTMs using single-qubit Wiesner states.
A new POVM bound limiting conjugate-basis guessing probability.
Security against classical-query adversaries and conjectured security against depth-bounded quantum adversaries.
Abstract
We construct simulation-secure one-time memories (OTM) in the random oracle model, and present a plausible argument for their security against quantum adversaries with bounded and adaptive depth. Our contributions include: (1) A simple scheme where we use only single-qubit Wiesner states and conjunction obfuscation (constructible from LPN): no complex entanglement or quantum cryptography is required. (2) A new POVM bound where e prove that any measurement achieving success on one basis has conjugate-basis guessing probability at most . (3) Simultation-secure OTMs in the quantum random oracle model where an adversary can only query the random oracle classically. (4) Adaptive depth security where, via an informal application of a lifting theorem from Arora et al., we conjecture security against adversaries with polynomial quantum…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture · Quantum Information and Cryptography
