Full characterization of core for nonlinear optimization games
Donglei Du, Qizhi Fang, Bin Liu, Tianhang Lu, Chenchen Wu

TL;DR
This paper provides a comprehensive characterization of the core in nonlinear optimization games by introducing a relaxation approach, broadening analysis scope and solving previously intractable game models.
Contribution
It generalizes linear core frameworks to nonlinear games, enabling analysis of complex models like quadratic, ratio, and combinatorial games.
Findings
Characterization of the core for broad nonlinear games
Application to classical and new game models
Extension to approximate core analysis
Abstract
We fully characterize the core of a broad class of nonlinear games by identifying a suitable relaxation for inherent nonlinearity, directly generalizing the linear frameworks in the literature. This characterization significantly expands the scope of cooperative games that can be analyzed and contributes to the literature on games induced from optimization models. We apply these insights to not only establish connections with and provide new insights on classical models but also solve new games untamed in the existing literature, including combinatorial quadratic and ratio games such as portfolio, maximum cut, matching, and assortment games. These results are further extended to more general models and also the approximate core.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Optimization and Variational Analysis
