Admissible Information Structures and the Non-Existence of Global Martingale Pricing
Alejandro Rodriguez Dominguez

TL;DR
This paper investigates the structural limitations of a unified information framework for asset pricing, demonstrating that certain market configurations prevent the existence of a single admissible filtration for joint martingale pricing.
Contribution
It introduces a novel endogenous approach to admissible information structures and proves the non-existence of a universal filtration in complex market settings with unspanned drivers.
Findings
Existence of a canonical minimal filtration for finite assets
Uniqueness and stability of the minimal filtration under certain conditions
Counterexample showing non-existence of a global admissible filtration with three unspanned drivers
Abstract
No-arbitrage asset pricing characterizes valuation through the existence of equivalent martingale measures relative to a filtration and a class of admissible trading strategies. In practice, pricing is performed across multiple asset classes driven by economic variables that are only partially spanned by traded instruments, raising a structural question: does there exist a single admissible information structure under which all traded assets can be jointly priced as martingales?. We treat the filtration as an endogenous object constrained by admissibility and time-ordering, rather than as an exogenous primitive. For any finite collection of assets, whenever martingale pricing is feasible under some admissible filtration, it is already feasible under a canonical minimal filtration generated by the asset prices themselves; these pricing-sufficient filtrations are unique up to null sets…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
