United We Defend: Collaborative Membership Inference Defenses in Federated Learning
Li Bai, Junxu Liu, Sen Zhang, Xinwei Zhang, Qingqing Ye, Haibo Hu

TL;DR
This paper proposes CoFedMID, a collaborative defense framework in federated learning that reduces membership inference risks by limiting model memorization and enabling client cooperation, with minimal utility loss.
Contribution
It introduces a novel collaborative defense approach for federated learning that combines multiple modules to effectively mitigate membership inference attacks.
Findings
Significantly reduces MIA success rates
Maintains high model utility with minimal loss
Effective across various datasets and attack types
Abstract
Membership inference attacks (MIAs), which determine whether a specific data point was included in the training set of a target model, have posed severe threats in federated learning (FL). Unfortunately, existing MIA defenses, typically applied independently to each client in FL, are ineffective against powerful trajectory-based MIAs that exploit temporal information throughout the training process to infer membership status. In this paper, we investigate a new FL defense scenario driven by heterogeneous privacy needs and privacy-utility trade-offs, where only a subset of clients are defended, as well as a collaborative defense mode where clients cooperate to mitigate membership privacy leakage. To this end, we introduce CoFedMID, a collaborative defense framework against MIAs in FL, which limits local model memorization of training samples and, through a defender coalition, enhances…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Advanced Graph Neural Networks
