Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure

TL;DR

This paper studies a Bayesian persuasion model where a sender commits to an experiment, privately conducts additional experiments, and selectively discloses outcomes to influence a receiver, highlighting conditions for optimal persuasion.

Contribution

It introduces a model allowing private experimentation and selective disclosure, analyzing equilibrium conditions for achieving the sender's commitment payoff.

Findings

Sender cannot attain commitment payoff if receiver is sufficiently uncertain and full-commitment optimal experiment benefits the sender.

Equilibria exist where the sender achieves their commitment payoff under certain conditions.

The model extends Bayesian persuasion by incorporating private experimentation and selective disclosure strategies.

Abstract

A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments they can perform (i.e., their type). We show that the sender cannot attain their commitment payoff in any equilibrium if (i) the receiver is sufficiently uncertain about their type and (ii) the sender could benefit from selective disclosure after conducting their full-commitment optimal experiment. Otherwise, there can be equilibria where the sender obtains their commitment payoff.