Existence of Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods: An Elementary Proof
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
TL;DR
This paper presents an elementary proof demonstrating that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist for selling multiple goods when buyers' valuation distributions have finite expectations.
Contribution
It provides a simple, accessible proof of the existence of optimal mechanisms in multi-parameter settings, expanding theoretical understanding.
Findings
Existence of optimal mechanisms proven with elementary methods
Applicable to multi-parameter valuation distributions with finite expectation
Simplifies previous complex proofs in mechanism design
Abstract
We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems