Bad News for Couples: Tight Lower Bounds for Fair Division of Indivisible Items
Max Dupr\'e la Tour

TL;DR
This paper proves tight lower bounds on the fairness of dividing indivisible items among couples, showing that envy-freeness up to a certain number of items cannot always be achieved, even in small groups.
Contribution
It establishes tight lower bounds for envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible items among couples, matching previous upper bounds and challenging prior conjectures.
Findings
Existence of instances where envy-freeness up to (rac{}{}) items cannot be guaranteed.
The lower bounds match the known upper bounds, closing the theoretical gap.
Surprising result that small groups do not necessarily allow better fairness guarantees.
Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to couples, where each couple consists of two agents with distinct additive valuations. We show that there exist instances of allocating indivisible items to couples for which envy-freeness up to items cannot be guaranteed. This closes the gap by matching the upper bound of Manurangsi and Suksompong, which applies to arbitrary instances with agents in total. This result is somewhat surprising, as that upper bound was conjectured not to be tight for instances consisting only of small groups.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
