EFX Allocations Exist on Triangle-Free Multi-Graphs
Mahyar Afshinmehr, Arash Ashuri, Pouria Mahmoudkhan, Kurt Mehlhorn

TL;DR
This paper proves that EFX allocations always exist in multi-graphs without triangles and provides algorithms for computing such allocations under certain valuation assumptions, advancing fair division theory.
Contribution
It establishes the existence of EFX allocations in multi-graphs with no triangles and offers algorithms for their computation under monotone and cancelable valuations.
Findings
EFX allocations exist in triangle-free multi-graphs.
A pseudo-polynomial algorithm computes EFX allocations for monotone valuations.
Polynomial-time algorithm for cancelable valuations.
Abstract
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents, with a focus on limiting envy. A central open question in this area is the existence of EFX allocations-allocations in which any envy of any agent i towards any agent j vanishes upon the removal of any single good from j's bundle. Establishing the existence of such allocations has proven notoriously difficult in general, but progress has been made for restricted valuation classes. Christodoulou et al. [2023] proved existence for graphical valuations, where goods correspond to edges in a graph, agents to nodes, and each agent values only incident edges. The graph was required to be simple, i.e., for any pair of agents, there could be at most one good that both agents value. The problem remained open, however, for multi-graph valuations, where for a pair of agents several goods may have value to both. In this setting,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
