Maximizing the Egalitarian Welfare in Friends and Enemies Games
Edith Elkind, Michele Flammini, Giovanna Varricchio

TL;DR
This paper studies the computational complexity of maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games, proposing approximation algorithms and hardness results for two key scenarios, with implications for coalition formation problems.
Contribution
It introduces new approximation algorithms and hardness results for maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games, including special cases with polynomial-time solutions.
Findings
Hard to approximate within $O(n^{1- ext{epsilon}})$ for Enemies Aversion
Polynomial-time $(n-1)$-approximation for Enemies Aversion
Approximation ratio of $2-rac{1}{n}$ for Friends Appreciation when each agent has at least two friends
Abstract
We consider the complexity of maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games -- a subclass of hedonic games in which every agent partitions other agents into friends and enemies. We investigate two classic scenarios proposed in the literature, namely, Friends Appreciation () and Enemies Aversion (): in the former, each agent primarily cares about the number of friends in her coalition, breaking ties based on the number of enemies, while in the latter, the opposite is true. For , we show that our objective is hard to approximate within , for any fixed , and provide a polynomial-time -approximation. For , we obtain an NP-hardness result and a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. Our algorithm achieves a ratio of when every agent has at least two friends;…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications
