A Post-Quantum Secure End-to-End Verifiable E-Voting Protocol Based on Multivariate Polynomials

TL;DR

This paper introduces the first post-quantum secure end-to-end verifiable e-voting protocol based on multivariate polynomials, addressing quantum vulnerabilities in existing schemes.

Contribution

It presents a novel e-voting protocol that is secure against quantum attacks, relying on the NP-hard MQ problem and using standard cryptographic primitives.

Findings

Protocol is secure under the hardness of the MQ problem.

Design is simple, efficient, and uses standard cryptographic primitives.

Addresses quantum vulnerabilities in existing e-voting schemes.

Abstract

Voting is a primary democratic activity through which voters select representatives or approve policies. Conventional paper ballot elections have several drawbacks that might compromise the fairness, effectiveness, and accessibility of the voting process. Therefore, there is an increasing need to design safer, effective, and easily accessible alternatives. E-Voting is one such solution that uses digital tools to simplify voting. Existing state-of-the-art designs for secure E-Voting are based on number-theoretic hardness assumptions. These designs are no longer secure due to quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm. We present the design and analysis of \textit{first} post-quantum secure end-to-end verifiable E-Voting protocol based on multivariate polynomials to address this issue. The security of our proposed design depends on the hardness of the MQ problem, which is an NP-hard problem. We present a simple yet efficient design involving only standard cryptographic primitives as building blocks.