Splitting infinity: a de Finetti game with state-dependent profit rates and singular control for diffusions
Piotr Chlebicki, Kristoffer Lindensj\"o

TL;DR
This paper analyzes a resource extraction game with diffusive dynamics, characterizing non-trivial equilibria where players extract based on state-dependent thresholds, including novel control mechanisms like local time reflection and skew points.
Contribution
It introduces the first characterization of non-trivial equilibria with state-dependent thresholds and singular controls, including local time and skew points, in a resource extraction game.
Findings
Existence of non-trivial equilibria with threshold strategies
Characterization of equilibria involving local time reflection
Introduction of skew points with singular control increases
Abstract
We study a game of resource extraction of a common good under one-dimensional diffusive dynamics with player actions corresponding to singular stochastic control up to absorption at , implying a trade-off between profitable resource extraction and sustainability. Unsurprisingly, immediate extraction of all available resources is an equilibrium. A main result is that we characterize and prove the existence of non-trivial equilibria that do not result in immediate absorption, but instead are attained with both players extracting resources according to a state-dependent rate of threshold type, corresponding to the presence of control only when the state process is in an interval . The underlying assumption is, roughly, that the drift coefficient of the uncontrolled state process grows sufficiently fast in relation to the discount rate, implying that the value for the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsStochastic processes and financial applications · Game Theory and Applications · Climate Change Policy and Economics
