Realism and Ontology in Quantum Mechanics and String Theory

TL;DR

This paper proposes a nuanced view of scientific realism that distinguishes between formal theoretical structures and ontological commitments, especially in the context of dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory.

Contribution

It introduces a new perspective linking realism to empirical contexts rather than fixed ontologies, inspired by Dennett's compression algorithm concept.

Findings

Supports ontological pluralism in dual theories

Preserves structural realism while accommodating dualities

Clarifies the distinction between realism and ontology

Abstract

Dualities in physics have challenged traditional forms of scientific realism by undermining the idea that theories describe a unique underlying ontology. In this paper, we develop a new perspective on scientific realism that responds to this challenge. We argue that while realist commitment remains appropriate at the level of a theory's full formal structure, ontological commitment should be treated as tied to specific empirical contexts rather than to a fixed, real ontology. Our proposal draws inspiration from Dennett's notion of a "compression algorithm" as a defining criterion of a scientific theory. On this basis, we separate realism from ontological commitment. To clarify the stakes of this distinction, we contrast our approach with common core realism, which locates ontology in the invariant structure shared by dual models. Focusing on dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory, we show how our view accommodates ontological pluralism while preserving a robust form of structural realism.