Strategic Bid Shading in Real-Time Bidding Auctions in Ad Exchange Using Minority Game Theory
Dipankar Das

TL;DR
This paper investigates how advertisers use minority game strategies for bid shading in real-time ad auctions, revealing that bidders partition markets and bid strategically to minimize costs and increase win chances.
Contribution
It introduces a novel application of Minority Game Theory to model and analyze bid shading behaviors in RTB auctions, supported by empirical data analysis.
Findings
Bidders partition ad markets into submarkets and bid as minorities.
Minority strategies lead to reduced costs and higher win probabilities.
Market dynamics are significantly influenced by strategic heterogeneity.
Abstract
Traditional auction theory posits that bid value exhibits a positive correlation with the probability of securing the auctioned object in ascending auctions. However, under uncertainty and incomplete information, as is characteristic in real-time advertising markets, truthful bidding may not always represent a dominant strategy or yield a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. Real-Time Bidding (RTB) platforms operationalize impression-level auctions via programmatic interfaces, where advertisers compete in first-price auction settings and often resort to bid shading, i.e., strategically submitting bids below their private valuations to optimize payoff. This paper empirically investigates bid shading behaviors and strategic adaptation using large-scale RTB auction data from the Yahoo Webscope dataset. Integrating Minority Game Theory with clustering algorithms and variance-scaling…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Digital Platforms and Economics
