Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences

TL;DR

This paper investigates the design of allocation rules for a single commodity with general preferences, focusing on non-obvious manipulability and revealing fundamental limitations and possibilities in achieving strategy-proofness.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of non-obvious manipulability in division problems and characterizes the conditions under which such rules can be efficiently designed.

Findings

Efficiency and non-obvious manipulability are incompatible.

Weakening efficiency to unanimity allows many non-obviously manipulable rules.

The study extends understanding of strategic behavior in allocation mechanisms.

Abstract

In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a relaxed form of strategy-proofness, known as non-obvious manipulability. We show that the combination of efficiency and non-obvious manipulability leads to impossibility results, whereas weakening efficiency to unanimity gives rise to a large family of well-behaved non-obviously manipulable rules.