Dysmemic Pressure: Selection Dynamics in Organizational Information Environments
Jeremy McEntire

TL;DR
This paper introduces the concept of dysmemic pressure to explain how organizations can converge on collective delusions due to communication biases and preference divergence, leading to epistemic failure.
Contribution
It synthesizes theories from communication, agency, and cultural evolution to formalize a mechanism explaining organizational dysfunction and illustrates it with real-world case studies.
Findings
Communication degrades as preference divergence increases.
Dysfunctional signals outcompete accurate ones in organizational meme pools.
Interventions focusing on culture or leadership often fail to address the underlying mechanism.
Abstract
Why do organizations comprised of intelligent individuals converge on collective delusion? This paper introduces dysmemic pressure as a formal mechanism explaining organizational epistemic failure. Synthesizing strategic communication theory (Crawford & Sobel, 1982), agency theory (Prendergast, 1993), and cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), I demonstrate how preference divergence between organizational agents generates stable equilibria where communication becomes statistically independent of reality, while transmission biases lock dysfunction into self-reinforcing states. The mechanism operates through identifiable dynamics: as the bias between sender and receiver preferences increases, communication precision degrades through progressively coarser partitions until reaching "babbling equilibrium" where messages carry no information; simultaneously, transmission biases…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Language and cultural evolution · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
