The algorithmic muse and the public domain: Why copyrights legal philosophy precludes protection for generative AI outputs

TL;DR

This paper argues that generative AI outputs lack copyright protection because they sever the human creative link, and granting such rights would unjustifiably enclose the digital commons, hindering innovation.

Contribution

It re-evaluates copyright philosophy to show why raw AI outputs cannot be copyrighted, emphasizing the importance of human contribution for protection.

Findings

GenAI outputs are not copyrightable due to lack of human creative link.

Traditional copyright theories fail to justify protection for AI-generated works.

Protecting raw AI outputs would enclose the digital commons and hinder innovation.

Abstract

Generative AI (GenAI) outputs are not copyrightable. This article argues why. We bypass conventional doctrinal analysis that focuses on black letter law notions of originality and authorship to re-evaluate copyright's foundational philosophy. GenAI fundamentally severs the direct human creative link to expressive form. Traditional theories utilitarian incentive, labor desert and personality fail to provide coherent justification for protection. The public domain constitutes the default baseline for intellectual creations. Those seeking copyright coverage for GenAI outputs bear the burden of proof. Granting copyright to raw GenAI outputs would not only be philosophically unsound but would also trigger an unprecedented enclosure of the digital commons, creating a legal quagmire and stifling future innovation. The paper advocates for a clear distinction: human creative contributions to AI-generated works may warrant protection, but the raw algorithmic output should remain in the public domain.