A Disproof of Large Language Model Consciousness: The Necessity of Continual Learning for Consciousness
Erik Hoel

TL;DR
This paper argues that current large language models cannot be conscious because they lack the ability for continual learning, which is necessary for a falsifiable and non-trivial theory of consciousness, supported by formal constraints.
Contribution
It provides a formal disproof of LLM consciousness based on falsifiability and introduces continual learning as a key component for a valid theory of consciousness.
Findings
Contemporary LLMs cannot be conscious under formal constraints.
Theories based on continual learning satisfy formal criteria for consciousness.
Lack of continual learning in LLMs is linked to their non-consciousness.
Abstract
Scientific theories of consciousness should be falsifiable and non-trivial. Recent research has given us formal tools to analyze these requirements of falsifiability and non-triviality for theories of consciousness. Surprisingly, many contemporary theories of consciousness fail to pass this bar, including theories based on causal structure but also (as I demonstrate) theories based on function. Herein, I show these requirements of falsifiability and non-triviality especially constrain the potential consciousness of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) because of their proximity to systems that are equivalent to LLMs in terms of input/output function; yet, for these functionally equivalent systems, there cannot be any falsifiable and non-trivial theory of consciousness that judges them conscious. This forms the basis of a disproof of contemporary LLM consciousness. I then show a…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEmbodied and Extended Cognition · Neurobiology of Language and Bilingualism · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
