Capacitive Touchscreens at Risk: Recovering Handwritten Trajectory on Smartphone via Electromagnetic Emanations
Yukun Cheng, Shiyu Zhu, Changhai Ou, Xingshuo Han, Yuan Li, Shihui Zheng

TL;DR
This paper introduces TESLA, a non-contact electromagnetic side-channel attack that can recover detailed handwritten trajectories on smartphones with high accuracy, exposing a significant security vulnerability.
Contribution
The paper demonstrates a novel electromagnetic side-channel attack framework capable of real-time handwriting trajectory recovery on commercial smartphones.
Findings
Achieves 77% character recognition accuracy
Jaccard index of 0.74 for trajectory similarity
Effectively recovers recognizable handwriting trajectories
Abstract
This paper reveals and exploits a critical security vulnerability: the electromagnetic (EM) side channel of capacitive touchscreens leaks sufficient information to recover fine-grained, continuous handwriting trajectories. We present Touchscreen Electromagnetic Side-channel Leakage Attack (TESLA), a non-contact attack framework that captures EM signals generated during on-screen writing and regresses them into two-dimensional (2D) handwriting trajectories in real time. Extensive evaluations across a variety of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smartphones show that TESLA achieves 77% character recognition accuracy and a Jaccard index of 0.74, demonstrating its capability to recover highly recognizable motion trajectories that closely resemble the original handwriting under realistic attack conditions.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
