TL;DR
This paper investigates the properties of VCG and GSP positional auctions within queue-based systems, extending previous research on position auctions in online marketplaces.
Contribution
It provides new insights into the behavior and properties of VCG and GSP auctions specifically in queue settings, building on prior work in sponsored search auctions.
Findings
Analysis of auction properties in queue contexts
Comparison between VCG and GSP mechanisms
Extension of previous auction models to queue scenarios
Abstract
In this work, we consider properties of VCG and GSP positional auctions in queues. The work is a continuation of "Position Auctions for Sponsored Search in Marketplaces" by the same author.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing