The Moroccan Public Procurement Game

TL;DR

This paper models the Moroccan public procurement market as a strategic game with complex payoffs, revealing the absence of pure strategy equilibria and deriving mixed-strategy solutions for specific cases.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for public procurement with discontinuous payoffs and provides explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for two-player and symmetric cases.

Findings

No pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.

Explicit mixed-strategy equilibria are derived for two-player symmetric games.

Conditions for equilibrium existence in multi-player scenarios are identified.

Abstract

In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we study the existence of a symmetric mixed strategies Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying the diagonal disjoint payoff matching condition.