Contextual Dynamic Pricing with Heterogeneous Buyers
Thodoris Lykouris, Sloan Nietert, Princewill Okoroafor, Chara Podimata, Julian Zimmert

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new approach to dynamic pricing with heterogeneous buyers, leveraging contextual information and Bayesian methods to achieve near-optimal regret bounds in a setting where buyer valuations are unknown and diverse.
Contribution
It develops a novel contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling that handles heterogeneity and unknown valuation distributions, with tight regret guarantees.
Findings
Regret bound of O(K_rac{dT}{ ext{logarithmic factors}}) for the contextual setting.
A variance-aware zooming algorithm for non-contextual pricing with optimal dependence on K_.
Theoretical analysis confirming tightness of the regret bounds.
Abstract
We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over rounds) that depend on the observable -dimensional context and receives binary purchase feedback. Unlike prior work assuming homogeneous buyer types, in our setting the buyer's valuation type is drawn from an unknown distribution with finite support size . We develop a contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling with regret , which we prove to be tight in and up to logarithmic terms. Finally, we refine our analysis for the non-contextual pricing case, proposing a variance-aware zooming algorithm that achieves the optimal dependence on .
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
