Comparing Knowledge: An Analysis of the Relative Epistemic Powers of Groups

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel epistemic logic framework to compare the knowledge capabilities of individuals and groups, analyzing their relative epistemic powers across different knowledge types and modal conditions.

Contribution

It develops a new logical approach using comparative knowledge assertions to evaluate the epistemic potential of groups versus individuals under various modal conditions.

Findings

Formalizes comparative knowledge assertions within a new logic

Analyzes epistemic power relations under different modal systems

Provides insights into self-knowledge and group knowledge dynamics

Abstract

We use a novel type of epistemic logic, employing comparative knowledge assertions, to analyze the relative epistemic powers of individuals or groups of agents. Such comparative assertions can express that a group has the potential to (collectively) know everything that another group can know. Moreover, we look at comparisons involving various types of knowledge (fully introspective, positively introspective, etc.), satisfying the corresponding modal-epistemic conditions (e.g., $S5$, $S4$, $KT$). For each epistemic attitude, we are particularly interested in what agents or groups can know about their own epistemic position relative to that of others.