A poset representation for stable contracts in a two-sided market generated by integer choice functions
Alexander V. Karzanov

TL;DR
This paper extends the stable contracts model in two-sided markets with integer capacities and choice functions, providing a poset representation of the set of stable contracts and efficient construction methods.
Contribution
It characterizes the set of stable contracts as a lattice and constructs a weighted poset isomorphic to this lattice, with improved complexity under certain conditions.
Findings
Set of stable contracts forms a distributive lattice.
Explicit poset representation of the lattice is constructed.
Poset size and construction time are polynomial under additional conditions.
Abstract
Generalizing a variety of earlier problems on stable contracts in two-sided markets, Alkan and Gale introduced in 2003 a general stability model on a bipartite graph in which the vertices are interpreted as ``agents'', and the edges as possible ``contract'' between pairs of ``agents''. The edges are endowed with nonnegative capacities giving upper bounds on ``contract intensities'', and the preferencies of each ``agent'' depend on a \emph{choice function} (CFs) that acts on the set of ``contracts'' involving , obeying three well motivated axioms of \it{consistence}, \it{substitutability} and \it{cardinal monotonicity}. In their model, the capacities and choice functions can take reals or discrete values and, extending well-known earlier results on particular cases, they proved that systems of \it{stable} contracts always exist and, moreover, their set …
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models
