Evolutionary Dynamics Based on Reputation in Networked Populations with Game Transitions

TL;DR

This paper investigates how reputation-based strategy evolution and game transitions influence cooperation levels in networked populations, revealing that environmental and structural factors significantly impact cooperative behavior.

Contribution

It introduces a model combining game and reputation dynamics with external factors and biased mutations to analyze cooperation evolution in complex networks.

Findings

Cooperation levels increase significantly under certain conditions.

Game transitions influenced by reputation affect strategy evolution.

Network topology impacts the promotion of prosocial behavior.

Abstract

The environment undergoes perpetual changes that are influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Consequently, it exerts a substantial influence on an individual's physical and psychological state, directly or indirectly affecting the evolutionary dynamics of a population described by a network, which in turn can also alter the environment. Furthermore, the evolution of strategies, shaped by reputation, can diverge due to variations in multiple factors. To explore the potential consequences of the mentioned situations, this paper studies how game and reputation dynamics alter the evolution of cooperation. Concretely, game transitions are determined by individuals' behaviors and external uncontrollable factors. The cooperation level of its neighbors reflects individuals' reputation, and further, a general fitness function regarding payoff and reputation is provided. Within the context of the donation game, we investigate the relevant outcomes associated with the aforementioned evolutionary process, considering various topologies for distinct interactions. Additionally, a biased mutation is introduced to gain a deeper insight into the strategy evolution. We detect a substantial increase in the cooperation level through intensive simulations, and some important phenomena are observed, e.g., the unilateral increase of the value of prosocial behavior limits promotion in cooperative behavior in square-lattice networks.