Local Dominance in Mixed-Strength Populations -- Fast Maximal Independent Set
Michael Luby, Sandy Irani

TL;DR
This paper extends the Luby MIS protocol to mixed-strength populations, proving that it still converges rapidly to local dominance despite heterogeneity, and explores how strength differences alter convergence dynamics.
Contribution
It introduces a mixed-strength agents model and proves the fast convergence of a generalized Luby MIS protocol in this setting, highlighting the impact of heterogeneity on process dynamics.
Findings
Fast convergence of the generalized Luby MIS protocol in mixed-strength populations.
Heterogeneity can reduce the progress per round, altering global behavior.
The model captures realistic local dominance patterns in natural systems.
Abstract
In many natural and engineered systems, agents interact through local contests that determine which individuals become dominant within their neighborhoods. These interactions are shaped by inherent differences in strength, and they often lead to stable dominance patterns that emerge surprisingly quickly relative to the size of the population. This motivates the search for simple mathematical models that capture both heterogeneous agent strength and rapid convergence to stable local dominance. A widely studied abstraction of local dominance is the Maximal Independent Set (MIS) problem. In the Luby MIS protocol that provably converges quickly to an MIS, each agent repeatedly generates a strength value chosen uniformly and becomes locally dominant if its value is smaller than those of its neighbors. This provides a theoretical explanation for fast dominance convergence in populations of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Applications
