Methodological Realism and Quantum Mechanics
Michael E. Cuffaro

TL;DR
This paper explores two different notions of completeness in quantum mechanics, contrasting the Everettian and Bohrian interpretations, and discusses their philosophical implications from metaphysical and methodological realism perspectives.
Contribution
It clarifies the distinction between two senses of completeness in quantum theory and analyzes how different interpretations align with these notions.
Findings
Everettian approach aims for ontological completeness
Bohrian approach emphasizes conceptual completeness
Interpretations can be mutually supportive despite opposition
Abstract
I distinguish two senses in which one can take a given physical theory to be `complete'. On the first, a complete physical theory is one that, in principle, completely describes physical reality. On the second, a complete physical theory is one that provides all of the conceptual resources one needs to describe any (in general probabilistic) physical phenomenon to any level of detail one likes, in principle. I argue that while the (neo-)Everettian approach to interpreting quantum mechanics aims to show that it is complete in the first sense, the (neo-)Bohrian approach begins from an understanding of quantum mechanics as being complete in the second sense. I then discuss some of the essential differences between how classical and quantum theory describe phenomena, and the way in which the quantum description can be thought of as a ``natural generalisation'' (to use Bohr's phrase) of the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Mechanics and Applications · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Relativity and Gravitational Theory
