Autodeleveraging: Impossibilities and Optimization
Tarun Chitra

TL;DR
This paper models autodeleveraging (ADL) in crypto futures markets, revealing a fundamental trade-off among solvency, revenue, and fairness, and proposing optimized mechanisms to balance these aspects.
Contribution
First formal model of ADL demonstrating a solvency-revenue-fairness trilemma and proposing mechanisms to optimize trade-offs.
Findings
ADL mechanisms face a solvency-revenue-fairness trilemma.
Optimized ADL mechanisms can reduce trader profit losses.
Empirical analysis shows significant profit overshoot and overutilization by exchanges.
Abstract
Autodeleveraging (ADL) is a last-resort loss socialization mechanism for perpetual futures venues. It is triggered when solvency-preserving liquidations fail. Despite the dominance of perpetual futures in the crypto derivatives market, with over $60 trillion of volume in 2024, there has been no formal study of ADL. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous model of ADL. We prove that ADL mechanisms face a fundamental \emph{trilemma}: no policy can simultaneously satisfy exchange \emph{solvency}, \emph{revenue}, and \emph{fairness} to traders. This impossibility theorem implies that as participation scales, a novel form of \emph{moral hazard} grows asymptotically, rendering `zero-loss' socialization impossible. On the positive side, we show that three classes of ADL mechanisms can optimally navigate this trilemma to provide fairness, robustness to price shocks, and maximal exchange…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFinancial Markets and Investment Strategies · Stock Market Forecasting Methods · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
