Monopolistic Data Dumping

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how a monopolist curates and prices access to a database for different user types, revealing distortions in data access levels compared to social optimality.

Contribution

It introduces a model of monopolistic data curation with distinct user types and characterizes the resulting distortions in data access and storage.

Findings

Monopolist offers full historical data access but restricts current data for forecasters.

Compared to social optimum, monopolist retains too much historical data.

The monopolist's data storage may be excessive relative to social welfare.

Abstract

A profit-maximizing monopolist curates a database for users seeking to learn a parameter. There are two user types: "Nowcasters" wish to learn the parameter's current value, while "forecasters" target its long-run value. Data storage involves a constant marginal cost. The monopolist designs a menu of contracts described by fees and data-access levels. The profit-maximizing menu offers full access to historical data, while current data is fully provided to nowcasters but may be withheld from forecasters. Compared to the social optimum, the monopolist keeps too much historical data, too little current data, and may store too much data overall.