Orchestrating Rewards in the Era of Intelligence-Driven Commerce
Paul Osemudiame Oamen, Robert Wesley, Pius Onobhayedo

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the limitations of traditional loyalty programs and proposes a hybrid, trustless framework that combines sovereign control with cross-brand interoperability, supported by a mathematical pricing model.
Contribution
It introduces a novel hybrid framework for loyalty programs that overcomes the scalability issues of existing coalition models using trustless exchange mechanisms.
Findings
Coalition loyalty programs often fail due to architectural limitations.
The proposed framework maintains brand control while enabling interoperability.
A mathematical pricing model supports fair value exchange across systems.
Abstract
Despite their evolution from early copper-token schemes to sophisticated digital solutions, loyalty programs remain predominantly closed ecosystems, with brands retaining full control over all components. Coalition loyalty programs emerged to enable cross-brand interoperability, but approximately 60\% fail within 10 years in spite of theoretical advantages rooted in network economics. This paper demonstrates that coalition failures stem from fundamental architectural limitations in centralized operator models rather than operational deficiencies, and argues further that neither closed nor coalition systems can scale in intelligence-driven paradigms where AI agents mediate commerce and demand trustless, protocol-based coordination that existing architectures cannot provide. We propose a hybrid framework where brands maintain sovereign control over their programs while enabling…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Digital Platforms and Economics
