Skating System Unveiled: Exploring Preference Aggregation in Ballroom Tournaments

TL;DR

This paper introduces the Skating System, a new voting method inspired by dance sport tournaments, analyzing its properties, vulnerabilities, and computational complexity in strategic manipulation and electoral control scenarios.

Contribution

It formalizes the Skating System as a novel voting rule, compares it with Bucklin voting, and studies its axiomatic properties and computational aspects in strategic settings.

Findings

SkS satisfies several desirable axioms like nondictatorship and majority criterion.

SkS is vulnerable to certain manipulations with NP-complete complexity.

Some electoral control problems for SkS are NP-complete, others are polynomial-time solvable.

Abstract

The Skating System, which originated from the scrutineering system in dance sport tournaments, can be formulated as a voting system: We introduce and formalize the Skating System Single (SkS, for short), a new voting system embedded into the framework of computational social choice. Although SkS has similarities with Bucklin voting, it differs from it because it is subject to additional constraints when determining the election winners. Through an analysis of the axiomatic properties of SkS and of its vulnerability to manipulative and electoral control attacks, we compare SkS with Bucklin voting and provide insights into its potential strengths and weaknesses. In particular, we show that SkS satisfies nondictatorship as well as the majority criterion, positive responsiveness, monotonicity, and citizens' sovereignty but violates the Condorcet criterion, strong monotonicity, independence of clones, consistency, participation, resoluteness, and strategy-proofness. Further, we study manipulation, i.e., where (groups of) voters vote strategically to improve the outcome of an election in their favor, showing that the constructive coalitional weighted manipulation problem for SkS is NP-complete, while the destructive variant can be solved in polynomial time. Lastly, we initiate the study of electoral control, where an external agent attempts to change the election outcome by interfering with the structure of the election. Here, we show NP-completeness for constructive and destructive control by deleting candidates as well as for constructive control by adding voters, whereas we show that the problem of destructive control by adding voters can be solved in polynomial time.