Common $p$-Belief with Plausibility Measures: Extended Abstract

TL;DR

This paper extends the agreement theorem from classical probability to plausibility measures, providing new proofs and demonstrating the minimal conditions needed for belief models to satisfy the theorem.

Contribution

It generalizes the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem to plausibility measures and applies it to various non-classical belief models, establishing minimal conditions for the theorem's validity.

Findings

The theorem is extended to plausibility measures.

New proofs are provided for the classical case.

The theorem's failure in certain models highlights minimal conditions.

Abstract

Aumann's famous Agreeing to Disagree Theorem states that if a group of agents share a common prior, update their beliefs by Bayesian conditioning based on private information, and have common knowledge of their posterior beliefs regarding some event, these posteriors must be identical. There is an elegant generalization of this theorem by Monderer and Samet, later refined by Neeman: if a group of agents share a common prior, update their beliefs using Bayesian conditioning on private information, and have common p-belief of their posteriors, these posteriors must be close (i.e., they cannot differ by more than 1 - p). Here, common p-belief generalizes the concept of common knowledge to probabilistic beliefs: agents commonly p-believe an event E if everyone believes E to at least degree p, everyone believes to at least degree p that everyone believes E to at least degree p, and so on. This paper further extends the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem from classical probability measures to plausibility measures -- a very general framework introduced by Halpern that unifies many formal models of belief. To facilitate this extension, we provide a new proof of the Monderer-Samet-Neeman theorem in the classical setting. Building upon both the original proof and our new proof, we offer two different generalizations of the theorem to plausibility-based structures. We then apply these generalized results to several non-classical belief models, including conditional probability structures and lexicographic probability structures. Moreover, we show that whenever our generalized theorems do not apply, the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem fails. These findings suggest that our results successfully identify the minimal conditions required for a belief model to satisfy the Monderer-Samet-Neeman Agreement Theorem.