Local unanimity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Xinquan Hu, Jun Zhang
TL;DR
This paper introduces the local unanimity axiom in Shapley-Scarf housing markets, extending social choice theory concepts to characterize the Top Trading Cycles mechanism under various preference domains.
Contribution
It proposes the local unanimity axiom and characterizes the TTC mechanism using this new criterion in different preference settings.
Findings
Local unanimity extends traditional unanimity in housing markets.
Characterizations of TTC mechanism under strict and weak preferences.
New axiomatic foundation for analyzing exchange mechanisms.
Abstract
In the housing market model introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), we propose a new axiom, local unanimity, that extends the unanimity condition widely used in social choice theory. It applies the unanimity condition to any subset of agents in the model who unanimously agree on the best exchange of their endowments. Building on this axiom, we provide several concise characterizations of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism under both strict and weak preference domains.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Economic theories and models · Auction Theory and Applications