T\^atonnement Dynamics for Fisher Markets with Chores
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta, Tianlong Nan

TL;DR
This paper studies t extasciitildeatonnement dynamics in chore markets, proposing a modified process that converges to equilibrium, and analyzes stability and convergence rates for various disutility functions.
Contribution
It introduces a relative t extasciitildeatonnement process for chore markets, proving its convergence and stability, and provides convergence rates for convex CES disutilities.
Findings
Naive t extasciitildeatonnement diverges in chore markets.
Relative t extasciitildeatonnement converges to CE under suitable step sizes.
Convergence rate for convex CES disutilities is O(1/ε^2).
Abstract
In this paper, we initiate the study of t\^atonnement dynamics in markets with chores. T\^atonnement is a fundamental market dynamics, capturing how prices evolve when they are adjusted in proportion of their excess demand. While its convergence to a competitive equilibrium (CE) is well understood in goods markets for broad classes of utilities, no analogous results are known for chore markets. Analyzing t\^atonnement in the chores market presents new challenges. Several elegant structural properties that facilitate convergence in goods markets-such as convexity of the equilibrium price set and monotonicity of excess demand under the t\^atonnement price updates-fail to hold in the chore setting. Consistent with these difficulties, we first show that na\"ive t\^atonnement diverges. To overcome this, we propose a modified process called relative t\^atonnement, where prices are updated…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Optimization and Variational Analysis
